Because of the overwhelming, positive response to the iPhone as compared to other smart phones, exclusive agreements between handset makers and wireless carriers have come under increasing scrutiny by regulators and lawmakers. In this paper, we document the myriad revolutions that have occurred in the mobile handset market over the past twenty years. Although casual observers have often claimed that a particular innovation was here to stay, they commonly are proven wrong by unforeseen developments in this fast-changing marketplace. We argue that exclusive agreements can play an important role in helping to ensure that another must-have device will soon come along that will supplant the iPhone, and generate large benefits for consumers. These agreements, which encourage risk taking, increase choice, and frequently lower prices, should be applauded by the government. In contrast, government regulation that would require forced sharing of a successful break-through technology is likely to stifle innovation and hurt consumer welfare.
Introduction
In the summer of 2009, the Senate Commerce Committee held a hearing to explore the competitive effects of exclusive handset agreements in the wireless industry. Exclusive agreements typically allow one particular wireless operator to serve as the sole distributor of a manufacturer's handset for a given period of time. The new chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has announced his intention to explore the issue of handset exclusivity. There are several pending petitions before the FCC that raise this issue, one of which seeks to ban exclusive handset contracts.
A key element that appears to be missing from the policy debate is whether exclusive contracts harm consumers. Antitrust scholars recognize that exclusive contracts have the potential under certain conditions to reduce consumer welfare. One condition concerns market power: one of the firms seeking an exclusive agreement must dominate access to consumers. A second condition is that the excluded product is needed by the dominant firm's rivals to constrain the prices the dominant firm can charge consumers. Economists sometimes refer to such a product as a "must-have" input. This article evaluates both conditions as applied to the U.S. mobile handset market. In Part II of this paper, we analyze whether Apple or any other manufacturer has established a dominant share in the mobile handset market. Market shares for smartphone sales in the United States reveal that, in the first quarter of 2009, RIM's BlackBerry Curve moved past Apple's iPhone to become the best-selling consumer smartphone in the United States-a result that is not consistent with the notion of dominance. 3 1. Senior visiting fellow, Smith School, University of Oxford; and senior fellow, Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy. This research was supported by Mobile Future. The views in this paper represent those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions with which they are affiliated.
We also review the rapid pace of innovation in handsets, which resulted in shifting market shares among handset makers. While exclusivity was not always the norm, we show that many of the iconic handsets introduced since Antitrust scholars also recognize that exclusive agreements can promote consumer welfare by encouraging risk-taking by entrepreneurs, and by aligning the incentives of dealers and manufacturers. For example, the economics literature recognizes that exclusive contracts can address dealer-incentive issues that arise when the manufacturer wants the dealer to invest in specific facilities or human capital to provide better service to consumers. In the absence of such agreements, dealers may not invest in an efficient level of promotion. Because exclusive contracts have the potential to increase or decrease welfare, they are analyzed under a "rule of reason" framework, which balances the benefits and costs of permitting such contracts. In Part III of this report, we explain that exclusive handset contracts are motivated for three procompetitive reasons: (1) to share the enormous risk associated with launching a new device, (2) to align the incentives of the carrier with the handset maker, and (3) to ensure network quality. From the perspective of a handset maker like Apple, aligning with a single carrier like AT&T ensures that Apple does not incur all of the downside risk in the event that the phone is not a success. The agreement also ensures that AT&T will make iPhone-specific investments such as marketing support, handset subsidies, and modifying its network to accommodate bandwidth-intensive applications.
New technologies often seemingly emerge from nowhere, but also frequently lose their luster quickly. Consider the fleeting success of Second Life, the virtual online world that was supposed to induce Americans to check out of their first life. Analysts predicted that Second Life could top the World Wide Web as the way to tap the Internet's resources. 4 Some even thought it could challenge the Microsoft Windows operating system. 5 The hype induced corporate giants like Nike and IBM to develop a presence in this virtual world. 6 Reuters stationed a reporter at its first virtual news bureau inside Second Life. 7 IBM sank $10 million on initiatives to further develop Second Life and the online threedimensional world generally. 8 Despite this hype, Second Life became part of a "hat trick that didn't happen," and the frenzy surrounding the online game fizzled. 9 As of July 2009, the site was populated by less than 90,000 users at a time. 10 MySpace marks another example of the transient nature of a so-called dominant technology. MySpace emerged in 2003, and by 2006, had grown to 70 million users.
Second Life's history has become just another cautionary tale, illustrating the short shelf life of some technologies that had high expectations. 12 Rupert Murdoch's News Corp. paid $649 million in 2005 for Intermix Media, owner of MySpace, before the company had managed to turn a significant profit. 13 Some analysts asserted that MySpace was a "natural monopoly," citing the high switching cost of moving from one social network to another as an impenetrable "network effect" giving MySpace dominance over other social networks. 14 By June 2009, Facebook, a rival social network, roughly doubled in size and became the largest network in the United States and globally while MySpace lost 5 percent of its users. 15 In this article, we explain how the mobile handset market is subject to these same disruptive forces-an iconic handset emerges, is quickly crowned the "winner," and soon thereafter is replaced by another technology that was not even conceived of at the time the "winner" was launched. Many iPhone-inspired smartphones, including the Blackberry Storm and the HTC G1, could unseat the iPhone in the smartphone segment. We argue that heavy-handed regulation of such dynamic markets is likely to reduce welfare on net. 16 The cost of erring through regulatory intervention-for example, by restricting voluntary private agreements that promote risk taking-can be significant. 17
I. A brief economic history of disruptive revolutions in the handset market
Delaying the benefits associated with innovation in mobile handsets could cost consumers dearly. In sum, exclusive contracts between handset makers and wireless carriers benefit consumers by encouraging innovation by both handset makers and wireless service providers that are vying for market share, and by enabling some handset makers to remain viable. These benefits take the form of greater variety of choices in handsets, greatly enhanced capabilities, and a more affordable range of device options. Banning exclusive contracts could have the unintended consequence of reducing innovation, reducing options, raising prices, and potentially establishing market dominance for an incumbent handset maker.
The preceding examples of products that were thought to be the "next big thing" and turned out to be passing fancies suggest that we should be careful in making predictions about the dominance of a technology, network, or even an idea. 18 
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A. Innovative handsets from the last two decades
Marty Cooper is the engineer who is credited with converting the cellular technology used in car phones of the 1970s into portable handsets. In April 1973, Motorola hosted a press conference at the Hilton New York to introduce Cooper's prototype of a cell phone. The handset, called a DynaTAC, had 35 minutes of talk time and weighed 2.2 pounds. In 1983, Motorola introduced a "lighter" version of DynaTAC (still weighing over one pound) with a list price of $4,000. 19 In 1989, Motorola introduced the MicroTAC flip phone. 20 At 12 ounces, it was approximately half the size of any of its rivals and was able to fit into a shirt pocket; the phone was originally priced at $2,995 (a full 25 percent discount from the earlier model). 21 Fortune magazine reported that the end of innovation was near: "Portable phones won't get a lot smaller than this one. After all, they have to reach from your ear to your mouth." 22 In 1996, Motorola offered a 3.1 ounce StarTAC mobile phone, hailed as the first wearable phone. One media source suggested that StarTAC was "about to revolutionize the cellular industry." 23 Another analyst (incorrectly) predicted that the StarTAC would ensure that the next generation of cell phones would be "worn on your wrist, a la Dick Tracy." 24 Still others predicted the introduction of "kid phones," with "only two buttons: one for mommy and one for daddy." 25 Although each of these phones was considered cutting-edge or "iconic" when introduced, these names have faded into obscurity with the passage of time. In this decade, brands like Treo, Blackberry, Razr, and iPhone have all competed for dominance in the handset market. The evolution of mobile handsets from the mid-1990s through 2002 set the stage for the introduction of personal digital assistants, thin phones, and more recently, smartphones.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that neither the MicroTAC nor the StarTAC would mark the pinnacle of innovation in cell phones. Table 1 shows that exclusive contracts were not always the norm; however, many, if not all, of the iconic handsets introduced since 2004 have been introduced pursuant to an exclusive contract. Although we cannot demonstrate that exclusive agreements were the cause of the recent innovation, it is clear that exclusive contracts are associated with recent innovation. (We discuss the use of these contracts, and the reasons for believing they promote innovation in this case, in Part III.)
Personal Digital Assistants. In 1993, BellSouth and IBM jointly introduced the Simon Personal Communicator, the first mobile handset that included pager, calculator, and calendar. 26 The handset weighed 21 ounces and sold for $900. 27 The Simon was hailed for its uniqueness. One article announcing its release described it as "the first time a company had placed a computer in a cellular phone, rather than placing a cellular phone in a computer. In 1996, Nokia launched the Nokia 9000 Communicator. 29 The Nokia 9000 was hailed as "revolutionary" and as signaling "the birth of the real information age." 30 The device combined phone, fax, address book, and e-mail in a single interface. 31 In the same year, Palm introduced the Pilot as its first personal digital assistant. It enabled people to organize all their data on a computer, and then sync it to the device. 32 Before being acquired by Palm, Handspring introduced the Treo 180, which merged the Palm with a cell phone in 2002. 33 The Treo 180 retailed for $399 and was available with either a built-in keyboard or "Graffiti" based handwriting software. The Treo was offered by both Cingular and VoiceStream, 34 which was later acquired by T-Mobile. The Treo 180 was highly praised upon its introduction. Walter Mossberg of the Wall Street Journal called the Treo 180 "the best combination of a phone and personal digital assistant by far." 35 Thin phones. In 2004, Motorola's Razr revolutionized the cell phone industry once again by shifting the focus from handset features to phone size.
But users quickly tired of being tethered to a computer, as they increasingly kept their data in multiple locations. They also were longing for a device that was more convenient to carry, which led to the next innovation. 36 Motorola recognized the need for simplicity when it developed the Razr. 37 Initially conceived as an "iconic, image-leading, low-sales-volume" product, the Razr exceeded expectations with sales topping the company's total lifetime projections just three months after its August 2004 release. 38 plummeted and new models did little to boost revenue, as Motorola struggled to sell its high-end phones. The revenues of Motorola's mobile-device division declined by over one third in 2007. 43 In that same quarter, Motorola Inc. posted a 94 percent decline in net profit. 44 Smartphones. The next revolution in handsets connected personal digital assistants to the Internet. In May 2009, Morgan Stanley Research described the migration to Internet-connected mobile devices, including smartphones, as "one of the biggest opportunities in the history of the technology industry." 45 Smartphones have been around for more than a decade. Yet of the billion-plus mobile phones operating throughout the world, only ten percent are estimated to be smartphones, suggesting tremendous growth potential.
"Smartphones" are cell phones that have many features of a desktop computer and are connected to the Internet. In addition to allowing people to make calls and check e-mail, smartphones can run programs or "apps" designed by third-party developers.
In 2005, Nokia launched the N series, a new line that combined a web browser, video, music and pictures into a single phone. According to analysts (who evidently could not see Blackberry or the iPhone on the horizon), the devices moved Nokia a generation ahead in the race to build the first real smartphone. 49 But it was Research in Motion (RIM) and not Nokia that pioneered the smartphone segment. Although RIM's Blackberry was not the first wireless device with reliable e-mail access, it popularized mobile e-mail among business professionals because of its integration with Microsoft Exchange servers and strong encryption. "Push" e-mail alerted users whenever they received a new email without having to continually check the server. Large corporations adopted the device en masse; for example, in February 2000, RIM announced a deal with Solomon Smith Barney to supply thousands of devices to its employees. 50 
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Rival handset makers were trying to topple BlackBerry in the smartphone segment, but with less success. In 2001, Kyocera introduced the Kyocera 6035.
In 2002, RIM introduced the Blackberry 5810, which combined the Blackberry's e-mail capabilities with wireless voice functionality. 54 The Kyocera 6035 was the first widely available smartphone with a Palm operating system. 55 It was described as "the first really good [personal-digital-assistant]-equipped phone" by Walter Mossberg. 56 In 2002, Danger, Inc. in conjunction with T-Mobile introduced the T-Mobile Sidekick. 57 The Sidekick was hailed as a "breakthrough wireless device" because it was the first device to offer user friendly e-mail, web surfing, and instant messaging at a price affordable to consumers rather than business people. 58 The device originally retailed at $199 after a rebate with unlimited data use for $39.99. 59
The next major upheaval within the smartphone segment was launched by Apple in 2007. Where the BlackBerry succeeded among corporate users, the iPhone succeeded among mass-market users. Smartphone productivity features of the iPhone included email, text messaging, web browsing, contacts, a calendar, and a notepad. The iPhone also came equipped with a built-in camera and a voice recorder. It had the capability to operate on a 3G or Wi-Fi network, 60
Despite iPhone's many impressive features that made it so popular with consumers, businesses were initially disappointed that the phone lacked the feature that made the BlackBerry so popular: push e-mail.
which allowed users to download data at relatively high speeds. The iPhone also had the capability to sync emails, contacts and calendars wirelessly and has a search feature for users to find items in its standard applications. 61 The second generation iPhone, released in June 2008, added GPS, high-speed 3G cellular network access, and push e-mail, along with security features to lure businesses. 62 Another key feature of the iPhone was the wide range of applications available for download both over the air and through the iTunes application for personal computers; as of August 2009, there were about 65,000 available. 63
AT&T Wireless and Research In Motion to Offer Integrated Wireless Device for Managing Email and Phone
Calls, CANADA NEWSWIRE, Jan. 29, 2002.
Apple's open platform has allowed independent developers to create and sell these applications, 54 incentivizing innovation and expanding the capabilities of the device. These applications range from video games to a Microsoft Office document reader.
A feature of the iPhone that received a great deal of attention was its touch-screen interface. Unlike many rival devices, the iPhone did not have a physical keyboard, relying instead on a touchscreen keyboard that appears on its display when prompted to by the user. Users scroll through pages with the flick of a finger, and can zoom into and out of pages with two-finger pinching motions. Walter Mossberg and Katherine Boehret of the Wall Street Journal described this touch-screen interface as "effective, practical, and fun." 64 By January 2009, more than 21 million iPhones had been sold. 65 As of July 2008, there were more than one billion downloads from the App Store since its launch. 66 As of May 2009, Morgan Stanley estimated that the iPhone accounted for 15 percent of global smartphone sales and 2 percent of all mobile devices. 67 Morgan Stanley predicted that iPhone's share of the smartphone sales would reach 17 percent by the end of 2010. 68 Despite these seemingly modest shares, the iPhone's popularity-and its exclusive agreement with AT&T-caught the attention of regulators. 69 The Palm Pre hopes to become the next iconic phone within the smartphone category. The Palm Pre launched June 6, 2009 for $199 at Sprint stores. 70 The Palm team is staffed with former Apple employees and is led by Palm president Jon Rubinstein, who built the original iPod for Steve Jobs (based around a tiny hard drive he discovered at Toshiba) and developed the iMac, which helped resuscitate Apple's fortunes. 71 Facebook Analysts recognized that a wireless user's e-mail, pictures, video, and /LinkedIn/Twitter contacts were increasingly hard to manage, even on the sleek iPhone. Pre's operating system, WebOS, claims to wirelessly combine all of those data into one comprehensive contact list, without duplicates. 72 When users start typing on the Pre, WebOS pulls up a pane that searches the user's contacts and also gives the user the option to search via Google, Wikipedia or Twitter. WebOS is designed to simulate the Web itself. Accordingly, anyone who can build a website can write applications for this platform, which is why Palm expects a flood of applications for the Pre. Finally, unlike the iPhone, the Pre can run several applications simultaneously. Each application is represented by a virtual card after it launches; switching between programs requires "leafing through the cards." The iPhone's significant technological lead over other smart phones likely created the impetus for Palm's innovation and potentially others. Competition in the mobile handset market continues to be fierce. Two days after the Pre's launch, Apple unveiled a newer version of its iPhone, the iPhone 3Gs. The updated model is up to twice as fast as the iPhone 3G and features a longer battery life. Other improvements include the ability to record video, a 3 megapixel autofocus camera, and hands free voice control. 73 Finally, smartphones do not constitute the "last" category of the next new thing in handsets. Computer makers have shrunk the size of laptops down to eleven inches or smaller, creating a new class of mobile devices called "netbooks" or "minis," which have been optimized for mobility and sell for under $500. An even faster version of the netbook called "ultrathins," which are priced between $500 and $900 and weigh under five pounds, were introduced in 2009. 74 According to IDC Research, netbook sales are expected to more than double in 2009, from 11.6 million units in 2008 to 26.5 million in 2009. 75
Walter S. Mossberg & Katherine Boehret, Testing Out the iPhone-We Spend Two Weeks Using Apple's Much-Anticipated Device To See if It Lives Up to the Hype; In
B. Market dynamics: share changes among handset makers around the introduction of the iconic device
When these devices are equipped with wireless chips (along with a mobile data plan), they become substitutes for smartphones.
With major innovations in the mobile handset segment in the wireless industry coming from a number of different firms, we would expect to see changes in market share over time and the absence of a clear, dominant firm that controls access to well over half of all customers. 76
Smartphone Segment
Based on analysis of the data below, we conclude that no firm, including Apple, had a dominant share of the handset market-either in the United States or globally-over our study period (2005 to 2009), and that shares are not stable over time due to innovations among new handset makers.
Market shares for smartphone sales in the United States are tracked by NPD Group, which estimated that in the first quarter of 2009, RIM's BlackBerry Curve moved past Apple's iPhone to become the best-selling consumer smartphone in the United States. 77 Apple is similarly not dominant in the global market for smartphone sales. Table 2 shows that Apple accounted for less than eleven percent of global smartphone sales as of the first quarter of 2009. Indeed, Nokia, the market leader, controlled less than half of the smartphone segment-far short of dominance-over the period studied. As Table 2 shows, the global shares of smartphone makers are not stable over time. For example, Apple suddenly emerges on the list of leading smartphone suppliers in 2008; while other manufacturers, such as Palm and Motorola, disappear. The only exception to this rule is Nokia, which has maintained a steady share between 40 and 45 percent over the time period analyzed. To understand what drove these shifts in market share, in what follows, we briefly summarize the major developments in the smartphone segment since 2005. As our discussion makes clear, share shifts are largely driven by the continuous introduction of the next, iconic phone.
By the first quarter of 2005, personal digital assistants with integrated wireless local area network or cellular capabilities accounted for approximately 55 percent of all personal digital assistants shipped. 80 RIM was the leading supplier of personal digital assistants shipments. Palm's personal digital assistants shipments declined significantly; its market share in the personal-digital-assistant segment fell from 30.5 to 18 percent, its lowest market share since it entered the personal-digital-assistant segment in 1996. 81 Nokia's re-entry into the personal-digital-assistant segment with its 9300 and 9500 models enabled Nokia to gain a significant foothold. 82 In the first quarter of 2006, Nokia accounted for 42 percent of the combined personal-digitalassistant and smartphone segment. 83 and shipments of the Motorola Q have been hampered by the minimum $80 monthly service plan offered by Verizon." 84 RIM enjoyed an increase in sales of 60 percent year-on-year, lifted by the newfound popularity of the Blackberry. Palm experienced a sales decrease of 26 percent in the first half of 2006, as "the company shifted its focus on sales of its Treo smartphones." 85
Gartner Says Wireless E-Mail Applications
In the first quarter of 2007, Palm and Motorola disappeared from the Gartner survey of the leading providers of smartphones. In the first quarter of 2008, Nokia still enjoyed 45 percent of the global smartphone segment; Gartner credits Nokia's success to the "variety of its smartphone portfolio, which includes a number of both high-end and mid-tier models available at different price points." 86 In the first two quarters of 2009, Nokia managed to increase its sales in the smartphone segment by introducing the Nokia 5800 into more regions.
RIM saw its share double from 2006, driven by sales of the BlackBerry Curve and Pearl. Seemingly out of nowhere, Apple became the third largest provider of smartphones with a 5.3 percent share, thanks to the introduction of the iPhone. 87 Nokia's N97 smartphone "met little enthusiasm at its launch in the second quarter of 2009." 88 Apple's iPhone 3G S sold 1 million units in its first weekend; its sales were also boosted by Apple's expansion into a larger number of countries and its price adjustments on the 8GB 3G iPhone. 89 RIM continued to grow its share, while HTC lowered its expectations for the second half of 2009 due to product delays. 90
Other Segments of the Handset Market
Radical shifts also occurred in the non-smartphone segment of the handset market over the same time period. As in the smartphone segment, Nokia was the industry leader, yet its share was below 40 percent from 2005 through 2009. Table 3 shows shares for what Gartner calls the "mobile terminal sales to end users," which includes smartphone sales (smartphone sales accounted for 13.5 percent of all handset sales in the first quarter of 2009), but also includes simpler phones that focus on telephony and text messaging. 84 Table 3 reveals that some carriers, such as BenQMobile, disappeared from the rankings entirely in 2007 after commanding over five percent of worldwide handset sales in 2005. It also shows that others, such as LG, realized a share increase of five percent in one year from 2008 to 2009. This rapidly changing marketplace landscape is not consistent with the notion of dominance.
To better understand what drove these and other radical shifts in market share, we summarize the major developments in the larger handset market, which includes smartphones (described above) and other types of handsets. Our brief history begins in the early 1990s. Once again, share shifts are frequently driven by the introduction of iconic handsets.
Motorola's (relatively) small MicroTAC, introduced in 1989, allowed it to distance itself from rival device makers. 91 By the middle of the 1990s, however, Nokia (with the introduction of the 9000 Communicator) and Ericsson took about five percentage points from Motorola's share, causing Motorola's share to fall from 65 to 60 percent. 92 Motorola's slide was reversed with the introduction of the popular and iconic Razr in 2004. 95 Led by its wideband-code-division-multiple-access phones, Nokia was the preferred brand in Western Europe, Central Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. 96 Motorola faced increasing competition in the supply of thin phones. 97 Samsung fell further behind Motorola. 98 In 2007, Nokia's continued strong sales were driven by its multimedia-rich phones; 99 it introduced the 5200 and 5300 in the end of 2006, and it introduced the Nokia 6300 in 2007. 100 Nokia sold close to 1 million Eseries devices to business customers. 101 It was on the verge of launching the 2630 and the Navigator. 102 Motorola lost nearly 2 percentage points of market share; it introduced the Razr2 with the hope of stimulating sales. 103 Samsung's market share remained unchanged relative to 2006, as it focused on "rich features and ultra slim design." 104 Sony Ericsson enjoyed modest share growth driven by both high-end models (K800 and W880) as well as the low and mid-tier products (W300, W200, and the K310). 105 LG also enjoyed share growth via the introduction of the LG Prada as well as new colors of the K800 Chocolate phone. 106 In 2008, Nokia maintained its market leadership due in part to strong sales in the ultra-low-cost segment. 107 Samsung surpassed Motorola in sales by focusing on touch-screen devices. 108 LG overtook Sony Ericsson to become the fourth-largest handset vendor, in part by focusing on touch-screen devices similar to the iPhone, 109 including the LG Prada, Shine, and KF600. Sony Ericsson blamed its weak results on difficult conditions in the Western European market, which led to a weakening in the demand for high-end phones. 110 In 2009, certain handset makers once again experienced significant share shifts. Relative to the first quarter of 2008, Motorola lost four percentage points in its market share by the first quarter of 2009 (from 10.2 to 6.2 percent); Samsung saw its share increase by five percentage points (from 14.4 to 19.1 percent), driven by the introduction of the Omnia, Tocco and Pixon touch-screen handsets. 111
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II.
What makes the iPhone special yet not a must-have input for wireless carriers?
Motorola appears not to have found a successor to its "once-dominant" Razr.
Economists are concerned about exclusive contracts between an upstream input provider and a downstream distributor if the excluded input is needed by a distributor's rivals to effectively compete. Inputs that are deemed essential to preserve downstream competition are called must-have inputs. 112 Although there are a few prominent examples, 113 it is hard to conceive of must-have inputs in the telecommunications industry. Must-have inputs are likely to be especially rare in technology markets where rapid innovation causes once "dominant" inputs to be dated in a short period of time. By limiting access to must-have inputs, the distributor may impair competition in one of three ways: (1) discouraging entry, (2) encouraging exit, or (3) raising a rival's operating costs. 114 Consistent with the economic view of exclusive dealing, courts have also focused on whether an input is "essential" or musthave in assessing the merits of cases involving exclusionary conduct. 113. For example, the Federal Communications Commission has determined that the television rights to a professional sports team that has been granted an exclusive (regional) territory by a league constitute a must-have input for competitive distributors of video programming. See, e.g., In the Matter of Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses, MB Dkt. No. 05-192, Memorandum Opinion and Order, released July 21, 2006, FCC 06-105, ¶ 124 (finding that a video distributor's "ability to gain access to [regional sports networks] and the price and other terms [or] conditions of access can be important factors in its ability to compete with [the distributor's] rivals.").
114. Rey & Tirole, supra, at 8 ("[W]e will define foreclosure as a situation in which: (i) a firm dominants one market (bottleneck good); and (ii) it uses its market power in the bottleneck good market to restrict output in another market, perhaps but not necessarily by discouraging the entry or encouraging the exit of rivals."); see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L. J. 234 (1986) ( "The simplest and most obvious method by which foreclosure of supply can raise rivals' costs is that purchaser's obtaining exclusionary rights from all (or a sufficient number of) the lowest-cost suppliers, where those suppliers determine the input's market price. Competitors of the purchaser experience a cost increase as they necessarily shift to higher cost suppliers or less efficient inputs. Antitrust literati know this as the 'Bottleneck' or 'essential facilities' problem.").
115. See e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-133 (7th Circ. 1983) (In MCI the 7th Circuit stated that plaintiff must prove "(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability to practically or reasonably duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility."). This general focus on ensuring that rivals maintain the ability to constrain dominant firms' prices is also at the heart of the Federal Communication Commission's regulation of affiliated cable programming. See 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3). Section 616 orders the Federal Communications Commission to promulgate rules that "contain provisions designed to prevent a multichannel video programming distributor from engaging in conduct the effect of which is to unreasonably restrain the ability of an unaffiliated video programming vendor to compete fairly by discriminating in video programming distribution whether the iPhone would satisfy this must-have criterion that the law and economics recognizes as being necessary to justify intervention.
A. Identifying the key attributes of the iPhone
The iPhone has attracted significant attention since its debut in the summer of 2007, when it drew long lines of fanatical followers who waited for days in front of Apple retail stores and created a scene that was "Part street theater, part 'iPhone slumber party.'" 116 1. As with the iPod, the iPhone syncs easily with Apple's popular iTunes software.
As described above, there are many features of the device that make it an attractive product. Based on analyst reviews, we have identified the following seven features as being the most important attributes: 2. It supports thousands of applications via its App Store.
3. The iPhone's touch-screen interface features "multi-touch" capabilities. 4. It supports video streaming of media files.
It runs over a super-fast 3G data network.
6. The built-in camera allows users to upload images to sites like Facebook.
It includes a GPS chipset that allows users to pinpoint their exact geographic locations.
While there are myriad other features available on the iPhone, these seven appear to be the ones that set the iPhone apart from the pack upon its introduction. The key question for regulators is: Can wireless operators, including rural operators, 117
B.
Are those attributes currently offered by rival smartphones-and if not, will they soon be replicated or superseded?
compete effectively in the downstream wireless services market without access to the iPhone and its key features?
Based on a review of available handsets in August 2009, we conclude that several competing mobile devices replicate the key features of the iPhone. Table 4 The first row of Table 4 shows that these competing smartphones are also capable of synchronizing with iTunes, albeit sometimes through a third-party program (as is the case with the HTC G1). 118 RIM and Nokia have offered their own software which reads the iTunes XML library file and syncs to their devices. In contrast, the Palm Pre identifies itself to a PC as an iPod and syncs with iTunes directly instead of through a 3rd party software. Although Apple temporarily disabled the Palm Pre's ability to sync directly with iTunes through an update to the music software, Palm has pushed back against Apple by updating the Pre's software so that it once again can sync with iTunes. 119 There are a few differences between the iPhone and its rivals. While competing smartphones include touch screens, the iPhone goes a step further in offering a multi-touch interface that is relatively unique among its peers. The Pre does include multi-touch features like the ability to zoom with the use of two fingers, but the status of these features are uncertain because Apple has been granted patents covering specific multi-touch capabilities used in the iPhone.
Moreover, touch-screen functionality (row 3) and the ability to stream video (row 4) and access data at fast speeds via 3G networks (row 5) are also provided by iPhone's rivals. Digital cameras (row 6) and GPO chipsets (row 7) are standard with these iPhone alternatives. Another difference between the iPhone and competing products is the selection of third-party applications available for the device. As of August 2009, the iPhone's App Store has many more additional software choices than do other devices. However, this differential should narrow over time. Google's Android platform, which is used in the HTC 119 G1, already has thousands of third-party applications, and tens of thousands of developers have downloaded the software development kit for the Palm Pre. 121 In summary, there is a lot of competition for the smartphone segment and several smartphones offer similar features to the iPhone. The competition among handset makers is not only leading to innovative designs, but it is also ensuring that the price for smartphones has declined to levels that many Americans can afford. Apple dropped the price of its first generation iPhone to $99 in 2009 (upon the introduction of the iPhone 3GS), and Palm reduced the price of its Pre shortly after its initial introduction. It seems quite plausible, based on the history of innovation in this area, that a new, iconic phone will emerge that supplants Apple's iPhone.
Although the iPhone had a head start in the "application wars," its advantage is not likely to last, as it seems largely due to being introduced first, rather than some intrinsically better functionality.
C. Even the best device makers, including Apple, stumble at times
Through the introduction of the iconic Blackberry, RIM has proven itself to be a leader in the handset industry. Expectations were high when RIM in November 2008 introduced a touch-screen smartphone, the Blackberry Storm, to compete with the iPhone. But the Storm has proven to be somewhat of a disappointment. Some proponents of regulatory intervention in the handset market have seized on RIM's initial stumble as evidence of Apple's dominance.
The Storm received many reviews that were critical. Upon the Storm's release, Yardena Arar of PC World declared, "the Storm's touch interface feels like a failed experiment." 122 David Pogue, an acclaimed technology reviewer for the New York Times, offered harsher criticism, calling the Storm the "BlackBerry Dud," and claiming that he "[hadn't] found a soul who tried this machine who wasn't appalled, baffled or both." 123 The reviewer went on to note that the Storm was not responsive to rotations of the phone; the phone would randomly switch from vertical to horizontal orientation even though the phone had not been rotated at all; and the camera software and video playback software both crashed the phone completely several times, requiring the reviewer to pull the battery to reset the Some might conclude that RIM's failure to produce a device that could successfully rival the iPhone proves the iPhone's must-have nature. But the fact that the Storm was a disappointment does not mean that the iPhone's market position is permanent. Innovation is a continuous process. Blackberry will likely learn from its successes and failures. There is too much at stake. Indeed, RIM and Verizon are introducing the Storm 2 for the holiday season in 2009, which is expected to have better hardware, a better touch-screen input method, and Wi-Fi access. 127 And the new Blackberry Tour, which is a smartphone that returns the traditional trackball and the elevated keyboard, has received glowing reviews. 128 On the subject of disappointing initial debuts, it is worth noting Apple stumbled in its initial attempt to deliver a commercially successful cell phone that integrated with iTunes. In 2005, Apple partnered with Motorola and Cingular (now AT&T) to produce the ROKR, a cell phone designed by Motorola that synchronized with iTunes and could play music like an iPod. 129 Much like the Blackberry Storm, this phone had significant deficiencies that hindered its commercial prospects. The ROKR could carry only 100 songs, regardless of the amount of memory included on the device, lacked the intuitive controls of an iPod, and took roughly an hour to transfer a complete set of songs from one's computer to the device. 130 Despite this initial stumble, Apple was able to turn around and release the iPhone within two years, which has proved to be a great success. 131
III. The role of exclusive agreements in promoting innovation in the handset market
Thus, we should not assume that competitors will be unable to match or beat the capabilities of the iPhone simply because they stumble once or twice. The competitive environment can change quickly in the world of handsets. The question to which we now turn is: Why do manufacturers and carriers enter into exclusive contracts in the first place? Before considering the benefits, we briefly discuss the costs of aligning with a single carrier from the perspective of a handset maker like Apple. By agreeing to an exclusive agreement with AT&T, Apple greatly reduced the number of consumers its iPhone would reach. Table 5 shows that the market for U.S. wireless services is not highly concentrated. Indeed, Bank of America-Merrill Lynch estimates that concentration among wireless carriers is less than all but one of the 26 other countries in its survey. 136 While it is certainly possible to induce subscribers of rival networks to change networks and incur the associated switching costs, the majority of handset purchases made pursuant to an exclusive agreement are made by the exclusive carrier's customers. For example, two-thirds of iPhone activations in the second quarter of 2009 were for existing AT&T customers.
Given this lack of concentration, when a handset maker like Palm aligns itself with a single carrier like Sprint, the handset maker effectively cedes a share of potential sales (in this case, roughly 89 percent of U.S. wireless subscribers). significant. Because handset makers would not enter into exclusives unless they were profitable, it must be the case that Palm's expected gains from the transaction exceeded these significant costs.
A. Procompetitive motivations for exclusive handset contracts
So what motivates these exclusive contracts? Handset makers seek exclusive agreements with carriers, not as part of some anticompetitive scheme to foreclose the carrier's downstream rivals, but to share the enormous risk associated with launching a new device, to align the incentives of the carrier with the handset maker, and to ensure network quality. Economic research has demonstrated that voluntary, exclusive contracts are often motivated for procompetitive reasons. 139
Risk sharing
From the perspective of a handset maker like Apple, aligning with a single carrier like AT&T ensures that Apple does not incur all of the downside in the event that the phone flops. The agreement also ensures that AT&T will make iPhone-specific investments such as marketing support, handset subsidies, and modifying its network to accommodate the bandwidth-intensive applications. The network upgrades that AT&T had to make to support the iPhone suggests that the iPhone would not be immediately available to operate on other carriers' networks that had not been similarly upgraded.
Exclusive contracts may correct dealer-incentive issues that occur when the manufacturer wants the dealer to invest up front in specific facilities or human capital to provide better service to consumers. 140 Applied here, handset manufacturers often require operators, as part of an exclusive agreement, to commit to investing in technical support for new handsets. But perhaps the largest commitment carriers make to the handset maker is to subsidize the cost of the handset so that it is more affordable to consumers. The (first-generation) iPhone models debuted unsubsidized by AT&T at $499 and $599. 141 AT&T subsidized the second-generation iPhone. 142 In particular, AT&T paid Apple $300 per 8 gigabyte iPhone 3G, 143 leaving AT&T's customers the balance of $199 (equal to the $499 total price less the $300 subsidy). 144 Risk sharing is even more important in the supply of mobile handsets given the combination of the massive upfront costs of developing a new phone and the uncertainty of demand for the new product. The shortcomings of the ROKR and the Storm highlight the demand uncertainty faced by handset makers; even the backing of a big carrier cannot guarantee success. With respect to the significance of the upfront costs, Apple reportedly incurred $150 million in developing the iPhone; Such subsidies are properly considered brand-specific commitments that are secured via the exclusive. Marketing support or promotion, which may also be considered a form of upfront investment, is discussed below. 
2.
Marketing support
Handset makers appear to value having a partner that has access to a base of installed subscribers to share some of their R&D risk. Although the exclusive agreement impairs the handset maker's access to large slices of the market (by virtue of each carrier's limited market shares), the agreement does give the handset maker assurance that at least some installed base of customers will likely purchase the new device.
Exclusive contracts also facilitate the coordination of marketing efforts between the downstream distributors and the upstream manufacturers of a product. In the absence of an exclusive agreement, downstream distributors will be hesitant to expend resources marketing a product because some of the benefits of marketing will accrue to downstream rivals. To make matters concrete, consider Verizon's decision to market the Blackberry Storm if customers who see the advertisement choose to buy the Storm from a rival carrier.
Because downstream distributors do not appropriate the entire benefit of their marketing expenditures, they will invest less in marketing. This problem is known as the "free-rider" problem in economics; rather than reap the benefits of their own marketing investments, firms will attempt to appropriate the benefits of their rivals' marketing campaigns. Exclusive contracts between producers and distributors allow distributors to appropriate the entire benefit of their marketing expenditures. In some circumstances, exclusive contracts can induce downstream firms to invest in the optimal level of marketing. 151 147. Silver, supra.
This coordination of marketing efforts between the handset maker and the carrier also benefits consumers. As two prominent competition economists recently wrote, when firms are able to free-ride off the marketing expenditures of other firms, "competition between retailers is likely to generate an insufficient level of service from both the firms' and the consumers' point of view Given the large investments AT&T has made in marketing the iPhone, there is no question that the exclusive contract between Apple and AT&T has benefitted both Apple and consumers. AT&T's 2008 Annual Shareholder Report suggests that its large outlays for advertising have been a significant factor in driving iPhone sales.
Exclusive agreements are one type of vertical restraint that can correct the free-rider problem. 153 AT&T attributed increased sales and advertising expenses of $572 million to "Apple iPhone related costs" for its 2007 fiscal year. 154
Quality assurance and reputation
Expenditures of this magnitude would not have been likely in the absence of an exclusive agreement covering the iPhone.
Exclusive deals also benefit upstream manufacturers and consumers by assuring product quality. 155 Specifically, exclusive dealing allows a manufacturer to closely monitor the distribution of its product so that the product does not become associated with distributors who might harm the manufacturer's brand. 156 This theory is particularly applicable to wireless handsets because the final handset product is necessarily tied to the network on which the handset is used. Thus, through an exclusive contract, a manufacturer like Apple can ensure that its handset is only used on a wireless network that can meet its exacting demands. AT&T invested an additional $2.5 billion in spectrum to accommodate the release of the iPhone 3GS. 157
B.
Why the critics of handset exclusivity are wrong Critics of exclusive contracts begin their analysis with a faulty premise-namely, that wireless carriers impose exclusivity provisions on handset manufacturers. Under the traditional paradigm of monopoly-leveraging, a carrier with excessive downstream market power would demand exclusivity (or even equity in the handset) as a condition of granting access to the carriers' customers. Having secured exclusivity, the carrier would then deny the must-have input to its rivals to distort downstream competition. A July 2009 letter to the Wall Street Journal by Hu Meena, President of Cellular South, argues that the nationwide carriers were seeking to impose exclusive contracts to increase their market power: "Now, as 'kings of the jungle' demand and get exclusive device deals to further increase their market share. But that story does not appear to apply here. A review of the circumstances surrounding the development of the iPhone reveals that the exclusivity agreement was the result of 153. AT&T Inc. Annual Report 2008, at 26 ("Contributing to our net additions and retail customer growth was improvement in postpaid customer turnover (customer churn) levels due to our strong network performance and attractive products and service offerings, including the Apple iPhone. The improvement in Churn levels benefited from network and customer service improvements and continued high levels of advertising.") 154. 
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Apple's extremely aggressive negotiating strategy. As we demonstrate below, it is often the handset manufacturers, and not the carriers, who are seeking the exclusive agreements.
For example, Apple viewed an exclusive contract with AT&T as a means to secure what has been described as an "unprecedented" 159 position in the development of a wireless handset. As part of this exclusive deal, Apple demanded that AT&T not place AT&T's brand on the phone, that AT&T distribute to Apple a portion of its monthly subscriber revenues, that the iPhone would only be available at Apple or AT&T stores, and that Apple maintain sole discretion as to whether to repair or replace defective iPhones. 160 Apple also insisted that the iPhone's development be completely secret. Apple only allowed three AT&T executives to see the phone prior to its release. 161 Verizon rejected this offer by Apple to make Verizon the exclusive distributor of the iPhone. 162 While the story of Palm's exclusive with Sprint is less clear in terms of which party was seeking to impose the exclusivity, it certainly is not consistent with the suggestion that exclusives are motivated for anticompetitive reasons. With the Palm Pre, Sprint was hoping to start a long recovery, having lost two percent of its customers in the fourth quarter of 2008 and nearly another one percent through the second quarter of 2009. This anecdote makes clear that AT&T's exclusive agreement with Apple was not a unilateral exercise of market power on the part of AT&T, but rather the result of hard bargaining on the part of Apple. 163 Sprint CEO Dan Hesse called the Pre Sprint's "coming-out party," 164 demonstrating to customers Sprint's reorganized customer service 165 and improved network. 166 Palm may have more to lose than Sprint. 167 Palm has been suffering for several years as its Palm OS and Windows Mobile-based phones have failed to take hold. 168 Palm reportedly teamed up with Sprint because it was a "comfortable" 169 fit-Palm has sold an increasing proportion of its devices through Sprint over the last three years. 170 159. Fred Vogelstein, The Untold Story: How the iPhone Blew Up the Wireless Industry, WIRED MAGAZINE, Jan. 9, 2008.
Palm's former CEO Ed Colligan said that the choice of carrier "came down to a long term relationship that we continue to build." 171 It is worth noting that duration of this exclusive agreement appears to be short-lived: Verizon announced at the end of May 2009 (before Sprint had even started selling the phone) that it too would offer the Pre by the beginning of 2010. 172
IV.
Other disruptive technologies on the horizon Thus far, we have focused on competition for the supply of handsets. Because most consumers typically purchase a bundle of products-a handset, an operating system, and wireless service (as opposed to a standalone handset)-wireless carriers compete for consumers through the quality and coverage of their networks in addition to the handsets they offer. Accordingly, our discussion would be incomplete without an analysis of the other important areas of competition: improved networks and operating systems. As it turns out, many of the innovations that affect the mobile user's experienceand threaten to disrupt the hegemony of today's handset makers-are occurring in these areas.
A. Improved networks
As of mid-2009, wireless carriers were battling to be the first to implement a 4G wireless network. There were two major 4G technologies in development: LTE and WiMAX. Many analysts forecasted that LTE would have a momentous impact on the wireless industry. 173 Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and MetroPCS are all developing LTE networks. 174 Indeed, some analysts speculated that MetroPCS, which is a relatively small carrier, would be the first to successfully implement an LTE network. 175 Verizon has announced that it will deploy LTE in 2010, while AT&T has indicated that that it will deploy LTE in 2011. In 2009, Sprint entered into a joint-venture with Clearwire and Intel to deploy a 4G WiMAX network. 176 
B. Improved operating systems
In addition to competition driven by advances in wireless carriers' networks, advances in handset operating systems promise to rearrange the entire wireless landscape. While 4G networks are months or years away, the next generation of mobile operating systems is imminent. As of 2009, certain operating systems had become well-established. According to Gartner Research, roughly half of the smartphones sold worldwide in 2008 ran Nokia's Symbian operating system, 180 over 16 percent ran RIM's BlackBerry operating systems, and nearly 12 percent ran Microsoft's Windows Mobile. 181 These operating systems face increasing competition. As the Economist explained, a battle is raging over "Smart-Phones' Souls"-the next frontier of competition in the wireless market will focus on "software, services, and content" rather than "hardware." 182 Some of the newest entrants into the smartphone operating system market are based on the open-source software Linux, which runs everything from servers to cell phones. 183 Open sourcing offers a low-cost alternative to proprietary software, and makes it easier for third parties to develop apps for a platform that runs on many different devices. 184 In August 2009, T-Mobile released in Europe and Asia its second-generation Android phone, called myTouch 3G, a version of HTC's well-received "Hero." Although the myTouch 3G lacks the iPhone's multi-touch screen, it has access to the significant and growing library of apps developed for Android. The G1's earlier version of Android was not "ready 180 for prime time," Sprint CEO Dan Hesse has said. 189 BusinessWeek claims that "Android has a better than decent shot" at building a substantial competitive presence. 190 Other companies, including Samsung, LG, and Motorola, are set to bring out Android-based phones in the near future. 191 Google notes that as many as 18 different Android phones will be available by the end of 2009. 192 In mid-2009, Verizon was reportedly close to offering an Android-based Motorola phone (codenamed "Sholes"), which would support multi-touch input, an eight-megapixel camera, and powerful graphics hardware to appeal to mobile gamers. Another Motorola Android phone, named "Morisson," was reportedly being sold through T-Mobile. Confirmation of these reports is expected at the Motorola Motodev Summit in October 2009. 193 In August 2009, Motorola confirmed for its investors that it will be shipping Android-based phones. 194 Finally, Linux Mobile ("LiMo") is being developed by an association of 50 technology and telecommunications companies, 195 including Samsung and Vodafone. 196 LiMo, however, differs from WebOS (which runs the Pre) and Android in that the consortium is focusing on building a flexible operating system rather than a user interface. 197 Phones built with LiMo will not have the distinctive user experiences that iPhone, Android, or WebOS phones carry; yet the software has attracted new members to the consortium for its potential to cut development costs while leaving phone makers flexible to create their own user interfaces. 198 Currently LiMo boasts over 30 handsets, including several models by Motorola, NEC, and Panasonic. 199
V. Learning from Past Mistakes
In dynamic industries, regulators need be more tolerant of new technologies that appear to be dominant. Unfortunately, the Federal Communications Commission appears not to have always heeded this advice. The agency has at times prematurely declared certain technologies as being dominant, and imposed harmful regulation. In the late 1970s, it required that wireline telephone companies "unbundle" telephone equipment from telephone services; 200 in 1981, it extended this requirement to the cellular operations of the telephone companies. 201 Accordingly, cellular providers that were affiliated with wireline telephone companies could not sell mobile handsets, nor could they offer certain additional services such as voicemail. 202 Skeptics might ask: What is the harm from declaring a technology in a dynamic industry to be dominant? Can't the regulation, as in the case of cellular unbundling rules, be reversed? Unfortunately, reversing an inefficient policy may not eliminate the harm, especially when the harm results from delaying the introduction of a new technology. After imposing regulations on cellular carriers in the early 1980s that barred the bundling of handsets with service, the FCC eventually recognized that competition between the cellular licensees rendered such regulation unnecessary, and in 1992, it allowed the bundling of cellular service and mobile phones.
As we explained above, these regulations likely reduced welfare because handset makers could not properly incentivize wireless operators to invest in an efficient level of promotion and device-specific infrastructure. 203 Empirical evidence suggests that the FCC's intervention in the mobile handset market may have postponed the development of the U.S. wireless industry between 1981 and 1992. Although we lack data for U.S. handset sales prior to 1990, global CDMA sales serve as a reasonable proxy for U.S. handset sales around that time: CDMA was adopted by the Telecommunications Industry Association as the North American digital cellular standard in 1993, and it was standardized for Personal Communications Services in the United States in 1993.
In the intervening eleven years, however, all the potential economies of scope associated with selling handsets and wireless services (and the associated consumer benefits) were squandered. And the incentive problems identified above concerning handset makers and distributors could not be corrected due to regulatory obstacles. According to Strategy Analytics, CDMA sales were non-existent in the 1980s, sputtered in the early and mid-1990s, and did not reach 10 million units until 1998. In contrast, the sales of non-CDMA phones reached 10 million units by 1993. Given this five-year lag, it is reasonable to ask whether the FCC's prohibition of bundled handsets and wireless services along with other harmful interference described below significantly slowed the adoption of CDMA handsets in the United States.
We are not the first to link the FCC's regulatory intervention in the mobile handset market to reductions in consumer welfare. In a seminal article published in 1997, Professor Jerry Hausman of MIT estimated that the Commission's delay in introducing cellular service cost Americans roughly $25 billion per year in lost welfare. 205 He attributes the delay to, among other things, the Commission's decision to delay the operations of the incumbent wireline network until the non-wireline network could begin operations. This type of interference, like the ban on bundling handsets and wireless service, squarely fits the paradigm of prematurely declaring dominance. Dr. Hausman concludes that "regulatory indecision made a new good, cellular telephone, unavailable in the United States when it was being offered in Scandinavia and Japan using equipment invented by AT&T Bell Labs." 206 205. See, e.g., Jerry Hausman, Valuation and the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1-38 (1997).
To the extent that the FCC's intervention in the mobile handset market in the 1980s slowed the pace of innovation, the associated consumer benefits of those new services were also delayed. 206 . Id. at 20. P a g e | 30
VI. Conclusion
Our overarching conclusion is that regulators should be very reluctant to intervene in the mobile handset market given the pace of innovation, the lack of any apparent anticompetitive motivation for exclusive contracts, and the significant efficiencies associated with exclusive agreements. Given the pace of technology development in the mobile handset market, the iPhone's position is hardly guaranteed. A new device could render the iPhone obsolete quickly. Ironically, the best way to replace to the iPhone could be through an exclusive contract between a handset maker and some other carrier.
Regulators may not fully incorporate the economic cost of intervention in their decision making because it is hard to assess the innovation that would have occurred in the absence of such intervention. In contrast, the benefits of intervention are easier to assess, and there is often a constituency that stands to reap those benefits. For example, some small rural carriers argue that terminating the iPhone-AT&T exclusive would enable them to offer the iPhone and more aggressively compete with AT&T for customers.
But do rural carriers or non-AT&T national carriers need access to the iPhone to compete effectively with AT&T? Our analysis in Part II shows that, while the iPhone is certainly special, there is nothing about it that constitutes a must-have input from the perspective of economics. The question should not be whether a company such as Cellular South would benefit with access to the iPhone (it likely would), but rather whether Cellular South needs the iPhone to constrain the price of AT&T's wireless offerings, so that consumers would benefit. We are not aware of any evidence that AT&T has been able to raise its wireless prices as a result of its exclusive contract with Apple.
Regulations that prohibited exclusive contracts for handsets also would impose significant costs, as described above in Part III. Specifically, the efficiencies made possible by an exclusive agreementsuperior innovation in design, coordination and development between device manufacturers and network providers to optimize the consumer experience with the device and the supporting services and shared risk in deploying massive marketing and consumer awareness campaigns-would no longer be available to handset makers, wireless carriers, and their customers. Indeed, the next iconic device that requires an exclusive contract to get off the ground would simply not be developed. These are real costs, but because they are harder to assess, policymakers who may be subject to political pressures may pay insufficient attention to them.
In summary, we are not good at predicting the future of technology, especially when markets are subject to rapid change. Precisely because the mobile handset market is so dynamic, regulators should err on the side of doing less. If a dominant handset emerges that is effectively sealed off by virtue of an exclusive contract, we believe that antitrust authorities could swiftly curb any abuse. In the meantime, the availability of exclusive agreements between wireless carriers and handset manufacturers should make it more likely that the next big thing in mobile handsets emerges sooner rather than later.
